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THE WIDOW AND THE SPERM:
THE LAW OF POST-MORTEM INSEMINATION
By Prof. E. Donald Shapiro' and Benedene Sonnenblick2
The ownership of sperm should be a very simple legal concept. In-
deed, during most of recorded legal history, there has never been any
question that the owner of the sperm was the man carrying it in his body.
With a few ancient Talmudic commentaries3 aside, the very possibility
of wandering sperm never occurred to lawyers throughout the ages.
However, in a recent case decided in the French Tribunal de grand in-
stance, Parpalaix c. CECOS,4 a court for the first time in legal history
was forced to address this issue.
Who controls the sperm when it has left the body? The man who
donated or sold it? The sperm bank that bought it? The sperm bank that
stores or possesses it? The man's spouse or family? What rights and
liabilities attach to the controller of the sperm? Who has the right to deter-
mine its use? May a sperm donor visit the product of the sperm? Is the
donor obligated to support the product of the sperm? What are the in-
heritance rights of the product of the sperm? Does the sperm have status
or is it mere property to be owned and disposed of by the wishes of its
owner, whomever that may be?
The issues of post-mortem insemination came into focus in 1984,
following the death of Alain Parpalaix, a citizen of France. In 1981, Alain,
who was then twenty-four, was suffering from testicular cancer and
undergoing chemotherapy. His doctor warned him that the treatment
would render him sterile. In December therefore, he made one "deposit"
of sperm at the Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme (CECOS), 5
a government backed research center and sperm bank. If Mr. Parpalaix
was thinking about his own mortality that day he gave no indication
of it to the sperm bank since he left no instructions as to the future use
1 A.B., Dickinson College: J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.D., New York Law School,
LL.D. Dickinson College; H.L.D., York College; The Joseph Solomon Distinguished Pro-
fessor of Law at New York Law School, and Supernumerary Fellow of St. Cross Col-
lege at Oxford University.
I B.A., Colgate University; J.D., New York Law School; associated with the firm
of Pegalis & Wachsman, P.C., Great Neck, New York.
I It was argued from the 5th century Babylonian Talmud that Sages recognized that
it was possible for a woman to become pregnant sine concubito while bathing in water
into which a man had discharged semen. Rosner, Artificial Insemination in Jewish Law
in JEWISH BIOETHICS 105, 107 (F. Rosner & J.D. Bleich eds. 1979) (citing Babylonian
Talmud Hagigah 14b). In his work, Haggohot Semak, Rabbi Perez ben Elijah of Corbeil
warned women against lying on the sheets upon which a man, not her husband, had
slept lest she conceive by his sperm. Id. In the oft-quoted Midrashic legend, Ben Sira
was conceived by the prophet Jeremiah's daughter while she bathed in water into which
her father, coerced by wicked men, had discharged semen. Id. at 108.
4Trib. gr. inst. Creteil, Aug. 1, 1984, Gazette du Palais [G.P.], Sept. 15, 1984, at 11.
' Center for the Study and Conservation of Sperm, a government run sperm bank
in the Paris suburb of Cremlin-Bicetre.
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of the sperm.6 The sperm was stored at CECOS in a frozen state in li-
quid nitrogen where it was kept at -3210 Farenheit for more than two
years.
At the time Alain donated the sperm in 1981, he was living with Cor-
inne Richard in Marseilles without the benefit of state or church mar-
riage. Alain's condition deteriorated quite rapidly. In a hospital ceremony
on December 23, 1983, Alain and Corinne were married. Alain died two
days later on Christmas day at the age of 26.
Corinne Parpalaix then requested Alain's sperm depositfrom CECOS.7
CECOS procedures, however, did not provide for such a return.8 The
center denied Corinne's request as other centers had denied the requests
of other widows.9 CECOS told Corinne that no law mandated the return
of the sperm as it now belonged to the center. CECOS advised Corinne
to seek a legal determination from the Ministry of Health, which generally
had held in the past that both the husband and the wife must consent
to artificial insemination: thus, presumably, both must be alive. The
Ministry, on May 10, 1984, chose not to solve this unique problem and
told Corinne it would decide at a later date. 1" Corinne reacted with
outrage and, joined by her in-laws, chose to pursue the matter in the
courts.
The Parpalaixs' claim sounded in contract. They contended that as
Alain's natural heirs (spouse and parents), they had become the owners
of the sperm and CECOS had broken its contract by not returning the
sperm. Plaintiffs relied on Article 1939 of the French Civil Code, which
governs contracts of deposit of material goods in general and provides:
"In the case of death of the person who made the bailment, the thing
bailed may be returned only to his heir."" Moreover, "[i]f the thing bailed
is indivisible, the heirs must agree among themselves in order to receive
it. " 2 Under this view, the sperm would be considered a movable object
or property and therefore would be inheritable." Corinne and her in-
laws also testified that although Alain had not left written instructions,
6 G.P., supra note 4, at 12. It is not clear from the text of the opinion or news sources
what the terms of the sperm bank's contract were.
I A French Woman Sues Over Sperm, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1984, at 7, col. 1. See
also Woman Must Wait To Know If She Can Have Dead Husband's Baby, Reuters N.
Eur. Serv., June 28, 1984 (available on NEXIS, Wires file) [hereinafter cited as Woman
Must Wait].
I Sperm banks in the United States also have no procedures for return of depositor's
sperm on his death. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
9 Life After Death; French Woman Wins Sperm Bank Decision, Washington Post,
Aug. 2, 1984, at B1, col. 1 (hereinafter Life After Death).
10 France; Love in Legal No Man's Land, Newsweek, July 16, 1984, at 44; Widow
Wants Child From Deceased Husband's Frozen Sperm, The Associated Press, June 29,
1984.
11 Code Civil [C. Civ.] art. 1939 (French Civil Code, J. Crabb trans., Rothman 1977).
12 Id.
13 G.P., supra note 4, at 12.
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it was his intention that Corinne use the sperm to conceive after his death.
Indeed, the only reason he had deposited the sperm was to avoid sterili-
ty. In a more dramatic plea, Corinne's attorney Paul Lombard argued
that she had not only a legal but also a moral right to obtain the sperm.
Persuading the court that the question was not just inheritance but love,
he urged: "Let her give life to this child, the fruit of a love that she goes
on expressing with quiet determination. It is her most sacred right."'14
The sperm bank's contentions were several. First, CECOS maintain-
ed that its only legal obligation was to the donor, not to Corinne. 15 Under
the normal deposit arrangement, the deposit is not returnable to the next
of kin of a deceased depositor. Second, CECOS argued that sperm is
an indivisible part of the body, much like a limb, an organ, or a cadaver
and is therefore not inheritable absent express instructions. 16 Since Alain
failed to state his wishes in regard to the sperm's future use, and since
he and Corinne were not married at the time he made the deposit, his
intentions at that point were unclear. Because it is impossible to ascer-
tain what his intentions were at the time of death, the sperm deposit
should not be turned over. Finally, CECOS contended that the act itself
of depositing the sperm was strictly for therapeutic purposes, apparent-
ly to aid Alain psychologically. CECOS argued that "[a]rtificial insemina-
tion is practiced only to overcome male sterility. Giving birth is not a
therapeutic matter.' 7 CECOS contended that going beyond the realm
of therapeutics would open the door to all sorts of abuses. 8
Before discussing the parties' contentions, the Tribunal de grand in-
stance acknowledged and briefly described the difficulties that French
laws governing inheritance rights and illegitimacy would impose on a
child born "post-mortem."'19 By strict interpretation of the Civil Code
(based on the Napoleonic Code from the early 19th Century), any child
born more than 300 days after the putative father's death is deemed il-
legitimate. 20 Even if the reach of the article were to be miraculously in-
terpreted or legislatively altered to establish paternity, the child would
be barred from inheriting through his father pursuant to another article
1' Woman Must Wait, supra note 7.
15 G.P., supra note 4, at 12.
16 Id. at 12.
17 Id. at 12; Woman Must Wait, supra note 7.
18 CECOS attorney Catherine Vincent-Paley mentioned as an example the possibility
of lesbian couples using donor sperm. Life After Death, supra note 9.
1' The term "post-mortem" insemination had been coined earlier by the French at-
torney Xavier Labbee. See Labbee, L'Insemination Artificielle Pratiquee Apres La Mort
Du Donneur, Gazette du Palais, Sept. 18, 1984, at 2, col. 1. American commentators
have referred to children so born as "posthumous sperm bank children" or more amus-
ingly because of the technique of freezing the sperm, as children "en ventre sa frigidaire"
which is a variation of the legal term commonly used for an unborn child, "en ventre
sa mere." Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Dece-
dent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942, 943 (1962) [hereinafter Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age].
" C. Civ. art. 315.
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of the code which states that to inherit, the child must exist at the time
of death and then expressly disqualifies "[olne who is not yet conceived."'"
The court offered no solutions to the obstacles created by these laws.
It seemed to imply, however, that, given the various new methods of
procreation, the laws were outdated. 22 Conclusions of law were limited
to the issue squarely before the court-whether Alain's wife and parents
had the right to obtain his sperm.
Although the simple solution would be to apply the contract principles
upon which both parties substantiated their contentions, the court ex-
pressly declined to do so. The court found that the articles cited by the
plaintiffs pertained only to those movable, inheritable things which may
be considered "objects of deposit" pursuant to other sections of the code.
The court also found that it is impossible to characterize human sperm
as movable, inheritable property within the contemplation of the French
legislative scheme. The code, therefore, was found wholly inapplicable.2 1
The court similarly disagreed with the defendant's position that the
sperm be considered an indivisible part of the body. Instead, it describ-
ed sperm as "the seed of life ...tied to the fundamental liberty of a
human being to conceive or not to conceive. " 24 This fundamental right
must be jealously protected, and is not to be subjected to the rules of
contracts. Rather, the fate of the sperm must be decided by the person
from whom it is drawn. Therefore, the sole issue becomes that of intent. 25
The court had to decide not only whether Alain Parpalaix had intended
his widow to be artificially inseminated with his sperm, but also whether
that intent was "unequivocable." 26 The absence of a written declaration
of Alain's intent did not by itself preclude the fulfillment. The court con-
sidered all relevant factors.27
The court found that Alain's wife and parents were in the best posi-
tion to ascertain "the deep desires of their son. "28 Through their testimony
they had established "the formal will of Corinne's husband to make his
wife the mother of a common child. " 29 This desire was consummated
by his entering into the solemn contract of marriage two days before
his death. 3 The court further found that because CECOS had at no time
21 C. Civ. Art. 725.
22 "Must we," queried the court, "under these circumstances, revise our traditional





27 Id. at 13.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. Indeed, it appears that the very purpose of the marriage was to provide Cor-
inne with easy access to the sperm in her quest to have Alain's child.
[Vol. 1:229
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told Alain that it would oppose any restitution of the deposit to a third
party, it had impliedly agreed to conform to his wishes. 31 That CECOS
had previously refused similar requests as "against normal procedures"
was not a sufficient basis for denying Corinne's request. Moreover, as
the court further noted, CECOS had not established its policy on this
question until after Alain's death. 32
Thus, the Tribunal de grand instance, found in the fundamental right
to procreate, the basis for the first judicial or legislative pronouncement
on post-mortem artificial insemination. Property rights and status became
irrelevant to the decision. The court ordered that CECOS, following the
expiration of the one month appeal period, return the totality of the sperm
drawn from Alain to a doctor chosen by his wife Corinne. 33 CECOS
made no appeal, and Corinne was artificially inseminated on November
28, 1984.34 Two of the nine test tubes containing Alain's sperm were us-
ed in tests and the remaining seven were injected in one insemination.
Unfortunately, due to the small quantity and poor quality of the sperm,
Corinne did not become pregnant. 35 Thus, the entire judicial exercise
which aroused proponents and opponents throughout the world resulted
in naught. Nevertheless, the legal proposition has been established; the
myriad of legal, moral, ethical, and medical problems have been discussed
in a legal forum.
The law has been unable to keep up with recent advances in the area
of artificial insemination (Al). The Parpalaix case represents only one
of the many legal problems created by inadequate legislation concern-
ing artificial insemination and other new procreative techniques. 36 The
lack of statutory guidelines in the United States and throughout the world
has left many unanswered questions about the ownership of the donated
sperm, the legal responsibilities of the sperm bank, the possibility of
"posthumous parenting,- 37 and the rights of the child conceived by the
different types of artificial insemination. 38
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 14.
3 Woman Fails to Conceive from Dead Husband's Sperm, Reuters N. Eur. Serv.,
Jan. 11, 1985 (available on NEXIS, Wires file).
35 Id.
36The new reproductive techniques include artificial insemination, in vitro fertiliza-
tion, surrogate motherhood, egg donation, artificial embryonation, and embryo adop-
tion. See Shapiro, New Innovations in Conception and Their Effects Upon Our Law
and Morality, 31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 37 (1986); L. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A
CONSuMER'S GUIDE To THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS INCLUDING IN VITRO FERTILIZA-
TION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1984) [hereinafter cited
as NEW CONCEPTIONS].
37 "Posthumous parenting" was a term used by Winthrop Thies in his article A Look
to the Future: Property Rights and the Posthumously Conceived Child, 110 TR. & EST.
992 (1971), and refers to a widow's use of her dead husband's sperm to conceive his child.
31 See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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To appreciate the extent and severity of the problems caused by ar-
tificial insemination, one must first explore the scientific and legal history
of the procedure. Artificial insemination in itself is not new. It has been
performed on animals for centuries. For years, breeders have used frozen
bull semen to inseminate their cattle. It is said that the first successful
artificial insemination occurred in the fourteenth century when an Arab
mare was impregnated with the semen of a stallion. 39 The first recorded
successful human artificial insemination was performed in England in
1770 by a surgeon named John Hunter. 40 This new practice was slow
to be accepted in the United States. It was not until nearly a century
later, in 1866, that a physician named Marion Simms successfully ar-
tificially inseminated a woman. 41 Instead of receiving praise worthy of
his accomplishment, however, his actions were looked upon with utter
disdain. The community's deep-seated religious and moral scruples about
the very idea of a woman becoming pregnant by such an unnatural man-
ner forced Simms to abandon his experimentation .42 In that same year,
an Italian scientist, Montegazza, found that human sperm could survive
freezing and proposed that frozen sperm banks be used by widows whose
husbands were killed at war. 43 The process had little success until 1949,
however, when it was discovered that the addition of a small amount
of glycerol before freezing would increase the chances of the sperm's sur-
vival. Currently sperm is frozen and stored in a tank filled with liquid
nitrogen at -3280 Farenheit. 44 Sperm which has been stored for over
ten years has produced healthy children. 4-
Today artificial insemination has gained widespread acceptance and
medical technology has made it increasingly available and inexpensive 46
to the estimatedkifteen percent 47 of all married couples who are infer-
tile. 48 For these couples, artificial insemination has become one of the
alternatives to adoption.
39 S. KLING, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 59-60 (1965).
40 W. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 6 (2d ed. 1976).
41 S. KLING, supra note 39.
42 Id.
43 IDANT LABORATORY, IDANT SPERM BANKING HANDBOOK (available from Idant
Laboratory, 645 Madison Ave., N.Y., N.Y.) [hereinafter Idant].
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 The cost of testing and freezing one ejaculate is $55.00. Yearly storage fees are
$45.00 for up to 6 units, $5.00 for each additional unit. One unit is approximately equal
to 0.5 cubic centimeters and is used for one insemination treatment. IDANT, supra note 43.
4 7 L . SPEROFF, R. GLASS, & N. KASE, CLINICAL GYNECOLOGICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY AND
INFERTILITY 468 (1984). See also L. ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 2 (referring to surveys
done by the National Center for Health Statistics in the United States).
48 Infertility is defined as one year of unprotected coitus without conception. This
estimate, however, may be well below the actual percentage, for two reasons: first, it
designates "infertile" women who have unsuccessfully tried to become pregnant in the
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The development of artificial insemination has also permitted the crea-
tion of a surrogate motherhood procedure. A woman who suffers from
blocked or nonexistent fallopian tubes (the largest cause of female infer-
tility) or who suffers from medical problems which make pregnancy ex-
tremely dangerous or undesirable can become a mother simply by con-
tracting with another woman or surrogate mother to carry and give birth
to a child. The surrogate usually is impregnated by the husband through
artificial insemination.4 9 Thus, the husband is the natural father and the
wife is the "social" or adoptive parent.50
Men who fear sterility resulting from disease, chemotherapy or similar
treatment, or exposure to hazardous substances and men who have
undergone vasectomies but wish to retain the option of having children
may be well advised to donate sperm for future procreation. The
availability of the frozen sperm can be considered "fertility insurance."51
There are three types of artificial insemination. Homologous artificial
insemination, or artificial insemination by husband (AIH), is self-
explanatory. In a simple medical procedure a woman, at the time of
ovulation, is inseminated by means of a syringe containing her husband's
semen, which may have been deposited before he became infertile. AIH
was made available to the astronauts in 1961. Therefore, even if space
travel were to harm their reproductive systems, they could still father
healthy children using the stored sperm.5 2
past year and cannot possibly include those who haven't tried to conceive and therefore
do not know they are infertile. Second, the estimate includes only married women. L.
ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 2 (quoting Martin O'Connell, Chief of the Fertility Statistics
Branch of the Census Bureau of the United States).
Medical studies indicate that 40% of infertility is attributable to male causes, 15%
to cervical causes, 10% to uterine causes, 30% to tubal and peritoneal causes, 20% to
ovarian causes, and 5 % to miscellaneous causes. Shane & Schiff, The Infertile Couple:
Evaluation and Treatment, 28 CLIN. SYMP. 5, 8 (1976).
49Although the impregnation can occur by other new procreative techniques such
as in vitro fertilization or embryo adoption or artificial embryonation. Shapiro, supra
note 36.
" Shapiro, supra note 36, at 46. See generally Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human
Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 639 (1983)
(concluding that adequate regulation of surrogate motherhood should cause no major
societal problems); Furrow, Surrogate Motherhood: A New Option for Parenting, 12
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 106 (1984); Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood,
1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147 (discussing legal issues raised by breach of contract and statutes
relating to surrogate motherhood); Holder, Surrogate Motherhood, Babies for Fun and
Profit; 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 115 (1984).
11 For example, when Roberto Casali learned that he had cancer, he deposited sperm.
After his death, his wife was inseminated and gave birth. Another man donated sperm
which was used to inseminate his wife during his chemotherapy treatments. She became
pregnant, but he died before the child was born. Later, she again used the stored sperm
to have a second child, this one "post-mortem." L. ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 196.
52 See Leach, supra note 19.
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Confused or combined artificial insemination (AIC) is another artificial
insemination procedure by which the semen of the husband is mixed with
that of an anonymous donor. The psychological effect of the mixture
is threefold. 3 First, it gives the husband some basis for believing that
he is the natural father of the resulting child. Second, it eases the physi-
cian's fear of committing perjury by listing the husband as the natural
father on the birth certificate. Third, it strengthens the already almost
irrebutable judicial presumption that the husband is the natural father
of a child born during the marriage.5 4 The practice of AIC is not nearly
as popular as it was a decade ago. 55
Artificial insemination by donor (AID) is artificial insemination us-
ing the sperm of a man other than the woman's husband. The "donor"
is very often a medical student, hospital resident, or other graduate or
undergraduate student who is given a standard compensation for his
"donation. ' 56 Most physicians try to match certain traits of the donor
such as hair, skin and eye color, height, ethnic or religious background,
and educational level.5 7 It is even possible for a woman to choose to be
inseminated with the sperm of a Nobel Prize Laureate. 8 AID can over-
come the barriers of conception created by problems of sterility or low
sperm count. It may also be used when incompatible Rh factors exist
in the blood of the parties, or when there is a possibility of a genetic
disease or mutation being passed to the natural children. Moreover, AID
enables an unmarried woman to conceive without heterosexual relations.
Almost always the donor is anonymous and signs a written waiver of
any rights as father. Often a doctor performing the procedure will use
the semen of a different donor in each treatment to further confuse the
identity of the "successful" donor. A 1979 survey of physicians indicated
that as many as six pregnancies per donor was typical. 59
53Shaman, Legal Aspects of Artificial Insemination, 18 J. FAM. L. 331, 332 (1980).
See also Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge For Family Law, 69 VA. L.
REv. 465 (1983) (examining artificial conception practices and the resulting legal problems).
54 Wadlington, supra note 53, at 469.
55 See id. (citing Curie-Cohen, Luttrell & Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial In-
semination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 587 (1979)).
1 The term "donation" is a misnomer. "Donors" are actually paid for depositing
semen in most sperm banks. See Wadlington, supra note 53 at 471 (citing W. FINEGOLD,
supra note 40). The more meticulous commentator may refer to the deposits as "vendi-
tions," to the men who produced the deposits as "vendors" and to the procedure which
utilizes them as "artificial insemination by vendor" (AIV). See Law Conference
1984-Discussion on Bioethics, 1984 N.Z.L.J. 237, 239.
5 Wadlington, supra note 53.
58 See Note, Eugenic Artificial Insemination: A Cure for Mediocrity?, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1850 (1981); W. CURRAN & E. D. SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE
934 (3d ed. 1982).
19 Wadlington, supra note 53.
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Because AID involves the use of a third party's sperm, it has typically
been a well-spring of legal and moral problems. 60 What is the status of
the child? The donor? The husband, if there is one? What are the legal
ramifications of the procedure? One interpretation is that the treating
doctor and the woman commit adultery by participation in the process
of AID. 61 This idea is absurd not only because it ignores the possibility
that the doctor may be a woman but also because the husband himself
may be administering the treatment. Another opinion is that the woman
is committing adultery with the donor of the sperm. 62 This too is
ridiculous. The woman has in all likelihood never met or seen the donor
who may be dead or a thousand miles away. Yet in Canada in 1921,
in Orford v. Orford,63 the Ontario Supreme Court equated AID with
adultery because "[tihe essence of the offense of adultery consists, not
in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the volun-
tary surrender to another person of the reproductive powers or faculties.
.. "64 This Victorian view of AID endured in some states at least until
the 1950's. In 1954, in Doornbos v. Doornbos,65 an Illinois court adopted
the Orford view. In 1955, the Ohio Senate contemplated, but did not
enact, a resolution to classify AID as adultery punishable by a fine of
$500 or imprisonment up to five years. 66 In MacLennan v. MacLennan, 67
the Scottish Court of Sessions held that AID, even without the husband's
consent, did not constitute adultery, since adultery is concerned with
the means of impregnation rather than with the impregnation itself. In
the MacLennan divorce action, the wife's answer to an allegation of
adultery was that she had conceived by AID. The MacLennan court
recognized that it is possible for a woman to artificially inseminate
herself.68 However, the court found that although "[ulnilateral adultery
is possible, as in the case of a married man who ravishes a woman not
19 Wadlington, supra note 53.
60 Id.; Shaman, supra note 53; L. ANDREWS, supra note 36; Kritchevsky, The Un-
married Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for An Expanded Definition
of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981).
61 Holloway, Artificial Insemination: An Examination of the Legal Aspects, 43 A.B.A.
J. 1089 (1957).
62 Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251; Doornbos v. Doornbos, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473,
aff'd 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
63 58 D.L.R. 251.
64 Id.
65 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, aff'd 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
66 Ohio Senate Bill 93 (1955).
67 1958 Sess. Cas. 105 (Scot. Outer House).
66 The procedure is so simple that it can easily be done without the aid of a physi-
cian. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 180.
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his wife, . . . self-adultery is a conception as yet unknown to the law."69
Through increasing criticism by medical and legal scholars alike, the
notion that AID constituted adultery was eventually rejected (although,
apparently, there are still some who view it as such),'70 but the legal status
of the child may still be in dispute. In Strnad v. Strnad, 7 a New York
court deemed a child conceived by AID legitimate by an inaccurate
analogy to the child born out of wedlock who is legitimized upon the
marriage of his parents. 72 In essence, the court reasoned, the child is
"potentially adopted or semi-adopted.' 73 Although the court failed to
recognize that a declaration of legitimacy is actually completely different
from adoption,'74 the result of the case seemed at last to signal the accep-
tance of AID. However in 1963, a New York court reverted to an un-
sympathetic view. In Gursky v. Gursky,'5 the court reasoned that even
though § 112 of the New York Sanitary Code recognized the practice
of artificial insemination, it could not be construed to render the resulting
child a legitimate issue. 76 It rejected the Strnad decision on the basis that
it was not supported by legislation or legal precedent. 77 Notwithstan-
ding the husband's consent or even insistence that his wife undergo AID
and his being listed as the father on the birth certificate, the court plain-
ly stated that in accordance with settled law, a child begotten through
a father who was not the mother's husband is deemed to be illegitimate.78
However, the court held that husband financially responsible for the child
on a contract theory. By consenting to the AID he had made an implied
promise to support the offspring in consideration of the wife's compliance.
Moreover, he was equitably estopped from denying support because his
wife had acted to her detriment in reliance on his consent.79
The most logical evaluation of the legal significance of AID was made
by the Supreme Court of California in 1968. In People v. Sorensen,8"
the court acknowledged for the first time that a child conceived by ar-
tificial insemination during a valid marriage was not the product of an
illicit or adulterous relationship and was entitled to the presumption of
legitimacy. The court assumed that without the husband's active par-
ticipation and consent, his wife would not have undergone the treat-
69 MacLennan, 1958 Sess. Cas. at 114.
70 See Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982 B.Y.U. L.R. 935.
71 190 Misc. 2d 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948).
71 Id. at 788, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
73 Id. at 787-88, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
74 Id.
75 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
76 Id. at 1086, 242 N.Y.S. 2d at 410.
77 39 Misc. 2d at 1087, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 68 Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968).
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ment.81 In ascertaining legitimacy, "the determinative factor is whether
the legal relationship of father and child exists. " 82 Any claims that the
sperm donor be regarded as the father were correctly dismissed: "the
anonymous donor of sperm cannot be considered the natural father as
he is no more responsible for the use made of his sperm than is the donor
of blood or a kidney."8 3 Because there is no natural father, we can look
only for a lawful father.84 The Sorensen decision was grounded also on
important public policy. Recognizing that labeling the child "illegitimate"
would serve "no valid public purpose,"85.the court noted that "[t]he child
is the principal party affected, and if he has no father, he is forced to
bear not only .the handicap of social stigma but financial deprivation
as well."
86
Until the mid-1960's, no states had legislation on artificial insemina-
tion. 87 Currently, twenty-eight states have statutes which support the
Sorensen findings.88 Ten states89 have been modeled after § 5 of the
81 Id. at 285, 437 P.2d at 499, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
82 Id. at 284, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
83 Id. at 289, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
14 See id. at 284, 437 P.2d at 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
8- Id. at 288, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13. See also People ex. rel. Abajian
v. Dennett, 15 Misc. 2d 260, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (estopping wife from
claiming that children born to her as a result of Al were not father's children and,
therefore, he should not be accorded visitation and custody privileges); State ex rel. H.
v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1982) (husband submitting to a blood grouping test for pur-
poses of showing he is not the father of the AID child was not permitted. The court
stated that such a test could potentially bastardize the child without determining pater-
nity, and would thus offend the public policy).
86 People v. Sorenson, 68 Cal.2d at 288, 437 P.2d at 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
87 Fashing, Artifical Conception: A Legislative Proposal, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 713,
718 (1984).
88 ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1985); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (1985); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 61-141(C) (1971); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 7005 (West 1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106
(1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f to -69n (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11
(West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-2 (1982), 43-34-42 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, § 1451-53 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to -130 (1981);
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1986); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b)
(1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West Supp. 1985); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.111(2), 333.2824(6) (1980); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (1982); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-6-106 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38 to :17-59
(West Supp. 1985); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1
(1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 551-553 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239,
.243, .247 and 677,355, .360, .365, .370 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1983);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975); VA. CODE § 64.1-7.1 (1980); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1985);
WYo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1985).
89 ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1985); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 257.56 (West 1982); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-38
to :17-59 (West Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp. 1983-1984); Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1986).
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Uniform Parentage Act 90 which was proposed in 1973. All statutes
generally require the written consent of both the "husband" and the "wife"
and provide that the husband will be considered the legal father. Two
states expressly deny any paternity rights to a third party donor.9 1 Records
must generally be kept confidential and must be filed with the state depart-
ment of health. In many instances, the physician must certify that he
performed the procedure.
9 2
Of the various states which have enacted legislation on artificial in-
semination, all but one 93 have left open the issue of what rights an un-
married woman has to the procedure. Some state laws appear to pro-
hibit artificial insemination of unmarried women.9 4 This is particularly
alarming considering that it has been reliably estimated that of the more
than 20,0009- babies born by artificial insemination in the United States
90 UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, § 5, 9A U.L.A. 592 (1979). Section 5 of the UNIFORM PAREN-
TAGE ACT provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with the semen donated by a man not
her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a
child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed
by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of
the insemination, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of
Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physi-
cian's failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All papers
and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the permanent record
of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject
to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown.
(b) The donor of the semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
11 Id. at 592-93. The statutes of Texas and Oregon explicitly state the rights and
duties of third party donors. All other states, however, imply that the donor has no
rights since the husband will be considered the legal father. See OR. REV. STAT § 109.239
(1985), TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Vernon 1975).
92 For a detailed overview of the various statutes on artificial insemination, see
Fashing, supra note 87. See also Andrews, The Stork Market: The Law of the New
Reproductive Technologies, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 50 [hereinafter cited as Andrews,
Stork Market].
9- Oregon expressly allows both married and unmarried women to use AID. The
statute merely requires a woman's written request and consent and "if she is married,"
her husband's consent. OR. REV. STAT § 677.365 (1985). Other states have eliminated
the adjective "married" from subsection (b) in their adoption of the UNIFORM PAREN-
TAGE ACT. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (Supp. 1986); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp.
1985); WYo. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1985).
94 Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreative Rights of the Unmarried,
98 HARV. L. REv. 669, 671 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Reproductive Technology].
95 Andrews, Stork Market, supra note 92, at 50.
1986-87] THE WIDOW AND THE SPERM
each year, 1,500 are born to single women.9 6 Commentators such as Bar-
bara Kritchevsky 97 assert that in view of the Supreme Court decisions
on procreation,98 "it is a legal and constitutionally protected right for
an unmarried woman to become pregnant by AI. ' 99 Extensive legisla-
tion on the subject, Kritchevsky claims, is not necessary unless a pro-
blem arises. A statute need only make three basic provisions. 0 0 First,
the statute should specify that it is legal for a physician to artificially
inseminate an unmarried woman who has consented. Many physicians
have refused to perform the procedure for fear of being prosecuted. Others
have refused simply because they believe that it is either immoral' 01 or
financially unreasonable for unmarried women to become mothers. 10 2
A legislative determination of legality would both ease the doctors' fears
and replace their moral judgment with that of the individual desiring
insemination. The second provision should be that the sperm donor's
health requirements be as strictly regulated as are the health requirements
for those donors whose sperm will be used to inseminate married women.
The third provision would designate the child a legitimate child of the
mother, a fact which would establish such rights as the ability to inherit
96 Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood by-Choice,
N.Y.U. REV. L. AND SOC. CHANGE 193, 195 (1983).
91 Kritchevsky, supra note 60. See also Shaman, supra note 53, at 344-46; Note,
Reproductive Technology, supra note 94.
91 I.e., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (Wisconsin statute prohibiting non-
custodial parents with legal support obligations from re-marrying without court approval
violated Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment since it restricts one's
fundamental right to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas Criminal statutes
prohibiting abortion except as a measure to save a mother's life violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the fourteenth amendment, which was deemed to include in one's right
to privacy, a "qualified right" to terminate one's pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts statute prohibiting the furnishing and distribution of con-
traceptives except to married persons violated the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment since it discriminated between two similarly situated groups-the mar-
ried and the unmarried); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (New
York statute prohibiting 1) any advertising or display of contraceptives; 2) any sale or
distribution of contraceptives to minors under 16; 3) all persons except pharmacists from
distributing contraceptives to those 16 and over, held to be unconstitutional in its en-
tirety under the first and fourteenth amendments as regards non-prescription contracep-
tives); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (Oklahoma statute providing steriliza-
tion of certain types of habitual criminals violated Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment as to one convicted once of stealing chickens and twice of robbery).
99 See Kritchevsky, supra note 60, at 40.
101 Le., lesbianism. Some doctors will perform AI on women involved in heterosexual
relationships only, while others believe any unmarried woman should not have children.
Id. at 3, 6.
102 Id. Many make the unfounded assumption that because a woman is unmarried
she will be unable to support the child alone. Id. at 3 & n.13, 17 n.79.
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through the mother or to sue for her wrongful death. Under this provi-
sion, the father would be listed as unknown. 10 3
A different problem arises when an unmarried woman wishes to be
inseminated with the sperm of a known donor. In that case, Kritchev-
sky suggests that each participant's rights should be dictated by their
intentions. If the man donates the sperm with the expectation that he
will be known as the father, then his paternal rights are to be protected.
The woman, however, may accept the sperm on the condition that the
donor waive all paternal rights. If the donor makes any later claim as
father, a judge should not be able to invalidate the donor's waiver even
though it is generally believed to be in the child's best interests to have
two parents.1 0 4
Only one case thus far in the United States has addressed the issue
of the rights of a known donor whose sperm was used in the artificial
insemination of an unmarried woman. In C.M. v. C. C.,  an unmar-
ried couple who had been dating wanted a child but allegedly did not
want to conceive by sexual intercourse.10 6 A physician refused their re-
quest for artificial insemination, but by speaking with the physician the
couple learned the basics of the procedure and tried it themselves in C.M.'s
apartment. C.M. would produce the sperm in one room and C.C. would
inseminate herself in another. After a few attempts they were successful.
During C.C.'s pregnancy the two broke off their relationship, but C.M.
still wanted to be known as the child's father and sued for visitation rights
on the grounds that it was their intention at the time of the artificial in-
semination that he would act as father.
The court equated C.M.'s position with that of the natural father of
an illegitimate child who is afforded visitation rights. Thus the deter-
mination was based on "whether a man is any less a father because he
provides the semen by a method different from that normally used."'10 7
If the couple had been married, there would be no question that the hus-
band/donor would be legally considered the father. The court found that
when a known donor intends to act as father and that intention is known
to the woman, he is legally the child's father notwithstanding their marital
status. 10 8 The decision was based secondly on the premise that it is in
the child's best interest to have two parents whenever possible.109 The
102 Id. Many make the unfounded assumption that because a woman is unmarried
she will be unable to support the child alone. Id. at 3 & n.13, 17 n.79.
103 Id. at 41.
104 Id. at 40-41.
105 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977).
106 One cannot help but be skeptical of the allegations of a successful "at home"
artificial insemination, considering the fact that even under ideal laboratory conditions,
the success rate varies from 20 to 100 percent. ANDREWS, supra note 36, at 181.
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court made no indication of who would be considered the father had
C.C. married another man during her pregnancy.
Another interesting case involving the artificial insemination of an
"unmarried""' woman is the recent California case of Loftin v. Flour-
noy. I One partner of a lesbian couple was artificially inseminated with
the semen of her lover's brother.1 2 One partner was thus the biological
mother and the other was the biological aunt and putative father. Two
years after the birth of the child, the couple separated and the mother
refused to allow the lesbian "father" to visit the child. The case before
the court was not the paternity rights of the sperm donor, but rather
the visitation rights of the other lesbian "parent." In its decision to grant
standard visitation rights, the court analogized the status of the lesbian
"father" to that of a de facto psychological parent.1 1 3
None of the statutes on artificial insemination indicate who owns the
sperm donation, but sperm banks generally require those donors who
are to be anonymous to sign a written waiver of any rights to the deposit
and any paternity claims to children born from it. In return, the sperm
bank guarantees the donor's anonymity. Thus, according to the contract
between the parties, the donor no longer "owns" the sperm.
Men who use sperm banks to store their sperm for their own future
use, however, do own their donation(s) of sperm and are required to
pay for its maintenance and its later withdrawal.114 Upon notice of the
death of the donor, however, many storage agreements authorize the
sperm bank to dispose of the deposit.' s Requests from the widow of
110 "Unmarried" in the legal §ense. The woman in this case was legally unmarried
although she and her lesbian lover were "married" by the Metropolitan Community
Church, a national church organized by and for the gay and lesbian community. See
Shapiro & Schultz, The Impact of New Birth Innovations and The Single-Sex Family,
24 J. FAM. L. 271 (1986).
... No. 569630-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1984).
112 This type of arrangement is not at all unusual in today's gay and lesbian com-
munity. See Stem, Lesbian Insemination, Co-EVOLuTION QTLY. (Summ. 1980); Moria,
Lesbian Self-Insemination: Life Without Father, OFF OUR BACKS, Vol. XII (Jan. 1982);
LESBIAN HEALTH INFORMATION PROJECT, ARTIFICAL INSEMINATION: AN ALTERNATIVE CON-
CEPTION, (1979) (do San Francisco Women's Centers, 3545 18 St., San Francisco, CA
94110).
113 See Shapiro & Schultz, supra note 110.
14 See supra, note 46 and accompanying text.
.. The IDANT agreement provides:
Upon the termination of Idant's obligations under this Agreement for any reason
whatsoever, Idant may dispose of the specimen by thawing and/or discarding or
by use in scientific research or in any other practicable manner, except that no
Specimen will be used, without the Client's written consent, for the purpose of
causing pregnancy by means of artificial insemination.
IDANT, supra note 43, at 14-15.
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the donor to be inseminated with the sperm, as a matter of practice, are
denied absent express instructions in the donor's will or a court order. 1 16
There are no reported cases thus far which indicate what factors a U.S.
court would consider in granting an order allowing the widow access
to the decedent's sperm deposit. No statute or case law in the United
States indicates whether the sperm should be treated, as Parpalaix con-
tends, as an object of inheritable personal property or as an indivisible
part of the body. For lack of better authority, the Parpalaix decision
should be considered. Moreover, in Griswold v. Connecticut117 the
Supreme Court recognized the right to bear or beget a child based on
the fundamental right of privacy. "Read in light of its progeny," 8 the
teaching of Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual deci-
sions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State."1 19
If an American widow were to be inseminated with her husband's
sperm, whether the child may inherit through the father is unclear. This
obstacle to the practice of "posthumous parenting" was foreseen by Pro-
fessor W. Barton Leach1 20 as early as 1962 and by Professor Winthrop
Thies in 1971.121 Both commentators formulated three approaches to
determining the inheritance rights. First, the states should enact legisla-
tion. Leach suggests statutes similar to those already existing in Vermont
and Kentucky.122 Thies proposes a more tailored statute which he would
entitle "The Uniform Rights of the Posthumously Conceived Child Act.."123
116 The agreement provides that "[iln no event shall Idant be required to release
any portion of the Specimen to any person other than the Client's physician or, after
the Client's death, to any person, except in either case as directed by an order of a court
of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 14.
117 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (a state may not prohibit a married couple's use of
contraceptives).
11 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
119 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 515 (1985).
120 Leach, supra note 19, at 942. Leach urged the legal world to heed his offered
solution, which is described below, and "[liet it not be recorded in history that the
American Institute of Biological Sciences has defeated the American Bar Association
and by our own rules!"
121 Thies, supra note 37, at 922.
122 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Baldwin 1981). VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §
501 (1975); These statutes provide that:
Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits of that rule, to approximate most
closely the intention of the creator in interest. In determining whether an interest
would violate said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall
be measured by actual rather than possible events, provided that the measuring
lives must have a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest.
See also Leach, supra note 19, at 944.
123 The Act would address five basic issues: (1) the rights of the child pursuant to
the decedent's instructions; (2) the child's rights where the will is silent; (3) the child's
rights where he or she is conceived by AID pursuant to the decedent's instructions; (4)
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The second method of determining inheritance rights is by provision
in the sperm donor's will. This would also solve the problem of whether
a widow may obtain her husband's sperm. Thies suggests the will set
forth a specific procedure with detailed guidelines.124 The third method
of determining the child's rights lies with the judiciary. Leach maintains
that the Rule Against Perpetuities, 125 which, as it exists, serves as a bar-
rier to the inheritance rights of the posthumously conceived child, is not
so rigid in its application that the judiciary cannot adapt it to the ad-
vances of medical science.
Leach has offered the first solution to any court faced with this pro-
blem. His well thought out "holding" would be that a posthumously con-
ceived sperm bank child of the donor's widow is the legitimate child of
the late husband and the widow, at least if she has not remarried at the
time of conception.1 26 Thies suggests that the child's right to inherit be
authorized by judicial decree'2 1 if, by the testimony of all interested par-
ties, the court is convinced that the decedent would have "wished his
widow, during her widowhood to conceive a child of his to take under
the child's rights as decedent's "issue," "distributee" and the like under a will executed
before and after the effective date of the Act; and (5) the cut-off point designating how
late after the father's death the child could be born and still fall under the protection
of the Act (if not specifically stated in the will). Thies, supra note 37, at 922.
124 For example, the will should instruct that after each artificial insemination treat-
ment, both the widow and the physician should make an affidavit swearing that the
treatment was performed using the testator's sperm. If the procedure is successful, the
widow, doctor and hospital should be required to file a second affidavit within 120 days
of the birth of the child stating the birth date, the name and sex, and whether the child
survived 90 days. If the child so survives, it will be deemed the testator's child and may
inherit according to the will. The will may, of course, designate other survival periods
and it should set limitations upon the number of occasions of birth (but not of children,
since the pregnancy could result in a multiple birth). The privilege of utilizing the testator's
sperm may be terminated upon the widow's remarrying. Id. at 922-23.
125 The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities provides that no interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life-in-being at the time of crea-
tion of interest. The period within which interests must vest or fail is 21 years after any
reasonable number of lives in being at the creation of the interest, plus actual periods
of gestation. However, periods of gestation are included in the period of perpetuities
only so far as they actually occur. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV.
638, 640, 642 (1938).
126 The court should define the duration of a man's life-in-being under the Rule
Against Perpetuities as "the period of his reproductive capacity, including any post-
mortem period during.which his sperm remains fertile." Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic
Age, supra note 19, at 944.
Thies similarly believes that the posthumously conceived child should serve as a measuring
life for grants running from his or her father's death, but that a specific number of years
after death should be designated as the period during which the child must be conceived
to be deemed a "natural child" and therefore a measuring life. He suggests a very
reasonable and logical cut-off point-the period should extend to the year that the dece-
dent would have reached the age of 71, the age at which the average man assumably
becomes incapable of reproduction. Thies, supra note 37, at 960.
127 Thies, supra note 37, at 923.
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his will."128 What would it take to convince the court? The closest relative
to the decedent would exercise substituted judgment. 12 9
By this analysis of inheritance rights, the finding of the Creteil Court
that Alain would have consented to Corinne's use of the sperm seems
logical. The fact that the decedent has done the act of depositing the sperm
must be some indication of his intent. Thus, the failure to provide writ-
ten consent, either in the will or with the sperm bank, should not pose
a barrier to the procedure.
In R.S. v. R.S., 10 the husband in a case involving AID contended that
the child should not be considered legally his because he had never sign-
ed the statutorily required consent forms. The court found the husband's
intent to be presumed due to his oral consent on several occasions, his
awareness of the fact that his wife was undergoing the treatment, and
his subsequent failure to object. 131 Although a dead man's consent can-
not be applied by acquiescence to the procedure as it is being perform-
ed, it may be determined, as in Parpalaix, by his prior statements to his
wife and relatives. The argument may be made, however, that because
the husband has no opportunity to object to the procedure while it is
being performed, prior statements alone cannot be a sufficient basis from
which to infer consent. The statements, made by a dying man, may have
been made more to comfort the saddened family than to authorize the
treatment. Moreover, if the very act of depositing the sperm can be seen
as an indication of intention, then the very failure of a man who knows
he is dying to leave precise instructions should also be interpreted as an
indication of posthumous intent.
Although the Parpalaix decision has been generally acclaimed as
eminently humane, 132 it has been criticized by doctors and lawyers
alike.113 The court's order is a victory for the widow and even for the
128 Id.
129 This substituted judgment would be similar to that of hospital ethics committees
and guardians of comatose or incompetent individuals as to whether the individual would
have wanted to undergo treatment, to be sustained by a respirator, or to be left alone
to die. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Superintendent of Belcher-
town State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Storar,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
130 9 Kan. App. 2d 39, 670 P.2d 923 (1983). See also K.S. v. G.S., 182 N.J. Super.
102, 440 A.2d 64 (1981); L.M.S. v. S.L.S., 105 Wisc.2d 118, 312 N.W.2d 853 (1981).
131 9 Kan. App. 2d at 39, 670 P.2d at 923.
132 Nau, Legal Perils of Posthumous Procreation, Manchester Guardian, Aug. 3,
1984 at 12. See Widow Wins Paris Case For Husband's Sperm, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2,
1984, at A9, col. 1; French Woman Wins Sperm Bank Decision, Wash. Post, Aug. 2,
1984; Dead Man's Sperm Case Forces Experts to Step Into the Unknown, Rueters N.
Eur. Serv., Aug. 2, 1984 (available on NEXIS, Wires file) [hereinafter cited as Dead Man's
Sperm].
133 French Government spokesman Roland Dumas reported that the number of
couples requesting artificial insemination treatment each year was between 2000 and
3000 and rising. "There is a danger, he opined, that sperm banks will spread uncon-
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father who can sire a child from the grave, but it may be detrimental
to the child. Though the court permitted Corinne Parpalaix to continue
expressing her love for Alain by bearing his child, nowhere in the Par-
palaix decision did it address and consider the best interests of the child.
Commentators have suggested that the child could suffer psychologically
from being conceived by a dead man. 134 How such psychological effects
would differ from those experienced by a child born to an unmarried
woman by AID or a child who, at a very young age, loses his father,
remains to be explained.
The August, 1984, decision disrupted the preparation of legislation
in France. Two draft bills, which coincided with most of the customary
CECOS rules, would have prohibited post-mortem insemination. 135 The
author of one of the bills felt that it was unethical to permit the insemina-
tion of single, albeit widowed, women because it would add to the cur-
rent superabundance of single parent families.136 The Parpalaix decision
left French legislators wary of the double risk of intervening in a rapidly
changing medical field and thereby transfixing its progress on the one
hand and seeing their laws become quickly outdated on the other. In
January of 1985, a seminar was held by the Committee on Genetics, Pro-
creation and Law (Procreation Genetique et Droit) which addressed the
legal and ethical issues created by the new procreative technologies. France
is still awaiting their report. Not until then will the legislators act. 137
Britain's Law Commission has already reacted to Parpalaix. The Com-
mission postulates that because a widow cannot be considered married
to her husband once he dies, artificial insemination with his sperm should
be considered AID and not AIH, thus rendering the resulting offspring
trollably." French Minister Calls for Test-Tube Ethics World Conference, Reuters N.
Eur. Serv., July 12, 1984 (available on NEXIS, Wires file).
French physician Monique Vigny wrote that sperm banking could upset the human genera-
tions providing the possibility of a child having half-siblings 50-100 years its elder. Dead
Man's Sperm, supra note 131.
One leading specialist interviewed was delighted by the decision, which he believed
"respected the person," while another believed the decision to be "extremely dangerous."
Id.
'134 Concerned for the child's psychological well-being, CECOS Professor Georges
David told reporters, "The child is the one who has been forgotten when it ought to
be the main person considered." Dead Man's Sperm, supra note 131. See also Nau, supra
note 132.
131 The French National Union of Family Associations holds strongly the notion
that children need both a mother and a father. President of the French Episcopal Family
Commission, Jacques Jullien was concerned that both the child and the widow could
become obsessed with the memories of the deceased. Les CECOS ont Recu Dix-Neuf
Demandes de a Restitution de Sperme Congele, Le Monde, Aug. 4, 1984.
136 Id.
137 Questions et Responses, 25 Fevrier, 1985.
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illegitimate. The Commission has, however, seemed to accept the prac-
tice if the widow declares her former husband as the father-in that case
he will be registered as the father without further inquiry. 138
Just as there are moral and ethical implications in permitting the widow
to use a sperm deposit for AIH, so are there moral and ethical implica-
tions in denying her this privilege. What is the rationale behind denying
a widow access to that which would only be discarded7 Suppose the
sperm, rather than be discarded, were to be designated that of an
unknown donor to be used in AID? If unmarried women have the right
to procreate, even using known donor sperm, what is the reason for pro-
hibiting a woman to choose to be inseminated with the sperm of a man
who was once her legal husband? Should not the widow, who knew her
husband's wishes and has presumably considered the disadvantages of
posthumous parenting have a role in making the decision to create a child?
Are there really any legal or public policy reasons that a vial of semen
from a man who pays for its storage should not be considered part of
his personal property to be made available to his heirs? These and other
considerations must be fully explored by legislators before a case such
as Parpalaix arises in the United States. As one commentator believes,
it is doubtful that the judicial processes can "cope effectively with the
problems of artificial conception during the remainder of this century."' 139
The legislature must act quickly, for it is inevitable that Parpalaix will
not be a unique case for the duration of this century or even this decade.
138 COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, in HUMAN PROCREATION ETHICAL ASPECTS OF
THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES 75 (1984).
139 Wadlington, supra note 53, at 477.
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